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Why do people buy air trip accident insurance? From a practical
viewpoint, the answer is simply that they consider the flight a risk
against which they are not otherwise insured, or one for which they
desire additional coverage. Many life and accident policies contain
various aviation risk exclusion clauses which generally exclude from
coverage any injury or death sustained while traveling in an aircraft.
4 2
The trend now is to include coverage for scheduled air carriers43 since
air travel is no longer considered to be an ultrahazardous activity.44
Undoubtedly, many travelers purchase air trip policies because they are
so readily available in airport waiting rooms and because they may
seem to offer additional security to one embarking on a trip by a
strange medium.
EDGAR H. MACKINLAY
RECRIMINATION AND COMPARATIVE RECTITUDE
Where both parties to a divorce action have been guilty of mis-
conduct amounting to statutory grounds for divorce, several states
deny relief to either party on the ground of recrimination regardless
of the circumstances in the case. In these jurisdictions the showing of
a valid recriminatory defense is an "absolute bar" to the granting of
a divorce.1
Much has been written concerning the origin of the doctrine of re-
crimination and many legal theories have been advanced -to sustain
its application.2 All of these theories supporting the doctrine, however,
'E.g., Kinard v. Mutual Benefit Health & Acc. Ass'n, 1o8 F. Supp. 780 (W.D.
Ark. 1952) (health and accident insurance); McDaniel v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 221
F.2d 171 (7th Cir. 1955) (life insurance). See generally, Annot., 17 A.L.R.2d 1o41
(1951); Vance, Insurance § 1oo (3d ed. 1951). Cf. Annot., 155 A.L.R. 1o26 (1945).
'E.g., McBride v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 147 Ohio St. 461, 72 N.E.2d
98 (1947) (life insurance); Hall v. Mutual Benefit Health & Acc. Ass'n, 22o S.W.2d
934 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) (air travel accident insurance); Downs v. Nat'l Cas.
Co., 146 Conn. 490, 152 A.2d 316 (1951) (health and accident insurance); General
American Indem. Co. v. Pepper, 161 Tex. 263, 339 S.W.2d 66o (196o), travel accident
insurance). See generally, i Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 6oi at 735
n.2 (1941); Vance, Insurance § ioo at 631 (3 d ed. 1951).
"Cf. Prosser, Torts § 42 at 2o3, § 61 at 345 (2d ed. 1955).
"Alexander v. Alexander, 14o Ind. 555, 38 N.E. 855 (1894); Paulsen v. Paulsen,
84 Iowa 131, 50 N.W.2d 567 (1951); Green v. Green, 125 Md. 141, 93 Atl. 400 (1915);
Morrison v. Morrison, 142 Mass. 361, 8 N.E. 59 (1886); Hoellinger v. Hoellinger, 38
N.D. 636, i66 N.W. 519 (1918).
2The doctrine originated in the application of the principle of "compensatios
criminis" in Roman law actions for judicial separation. Where the husband de-
fended upon the grounds of the wife's adultry, the wife could overcome the defense
CASE COMMENTS
are to some extent, unsatisfactory. Some writers have argued that the
doctrine has no place in our modem society and that it should be
excluded from our divorce courts.3 Nevertheless, with varying re-
strictions the doctrine is still upheld in the majority of American
states, often on the grounds that a litigant must come into equity
with "clean hands."
In the recent North Dakota case of Kucera v. Kucera,4 the wife
sued for a divorce alleging extreme mental cruelty. The defendant
counterclaimed for a divorce on the basis of the wife's adultery and
also on the grounds of extreme mental cruelty. The trial court, finding
sufficient evidence to support the wife's claim, granted her a decree
dissolving the bonds of matrimony.
On appeal it was found that, while defendant had failed to prove
his allegation of adultery, his evidence did establish misconduct of
the wife amounting to extreme mental cruelty and also willful deser-
tion, even though the latter ground was not raised in the pleadings.5
A North Dakota statute denies the right to a divorce where the de-
by showing the husband's adultery. See Forster v. Forster, 1 Hagg. Con. 142, 161
Eng. Rep. 504 (179o). Later authority rests the doctrine on principles of contract,
stating that the plaintiff cannot recover if he has violated the mutual covenants of
the agreement. Connant v. Connant, io Cal. 249 (1858). The most common argu-
ment advanced for the doctrine of recrimination is the maxim that a party must
come into equity with "clean hands," and one seeking divorce who has himself
committed acts of misconduct cannot be said to come before the court with "clean"
hands." Roxborough v. Roxborough, 269 Mich. 569, 257 N.W. 747 (1934). There is
authority to the effect that acceptance of the doctrine was to some extent a man-
ifestation of the public policy to prohibit two persons, both of whom have ex-
hibited complete irreverence for the marital status, from entering upon new mar-
riage contracts. Nebraska acknowledged this policy in such a situation when it
said that "neither. .. [party] should be relieved from the restraint of the marriage
relation and permitted to contract new alliances." Goings v. Goings, go Neb. 223, 133
N.W. 199 (1911). Similarly, the Oregon court said that "if a divorce is denied these
parties and they refuse to settle their differences and effect a reconciliation, or put
in order the pieces of this broken home ... at least they cannot, either of them,
go out and start another home, to crumble and fold when the storm strikes." Parks
v. Parks, 182 Ore. 322, 187 P.2d 145, 147 (1947).
ONote, 26 Colum. L. Rev. 83 (1926).
'117 N.W.2d 8io (N.D. 1962).
5A showing of the existence of a recriminatory defense may arise in several
ways: (i) alleged by the defendant in his counterclaim for a divorce decree in his
favor; (2) in the pleadings as a defense to the principal action; (3) where allega-
dons as to plaintiff's misconduct were not included in the pleadings, but the court
noticed the defense on its own motion. See Street v. Street, 48 Del. 272, lo A.2d 8o3
(1953), where the court granted a divorce decree to the husband, and in an en-
tirely different action the following week learned of the existence of a recriminatory
defense against the husband and vacated the divorce decree on its own motion.
See also, Green v. Green, 125 Md. 141, 93 At. 400 (1915), where in an uncontested
action, the husband's own testimony showed that he had been guilty of adultery.
1963]
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fendant has shown grounds for divorce against the plaintiff "in bar
of the plaintiff's cause of divorce." 6 The statute has been construed to
mean tht the court may not weigh the gravity of the offenses proved,
and so cannot exercise discretion and allow a divorce in the face of
a recriminatory defence.7 Therefore, the court reached the result that
this statute was an absolute bar to the granting of a divorce to either
partys On this record the decision in Kucera, although solidly sup-
ported by precedent in the jurisdiction, is not supported in logic, nor
does it seem to serve any valid public interest of the state. The court
acknowledged this when, in stating that the statute barred the exer-
cise of discretion, it held that a divorce must be denied "even though
we believe the legitimate ends of the marriage have been destroyed
and a divorce perhaps would be the better solution for the difficulties
facing the parties." 9
A great deal of uncertainty exists in the law in this area. Courts,
on the one hand, recognize their duty to safeguard the sanctity of mar-
riage, while on the other hand, they acknowledge that it is futile to re-
quire two persons to remain legally bound in matrimony when there
exists little hope that the parties will live together again. The deci-
sions fall generally into four categories. First, one category, exempli-
fied by Kucera, extends the principle of recrimination to its extreme,
holding that any statutory ground for divorce proved against a plain-
tiff will absolutely bar his relief. 10 Secondly, a few states, led by Nevada,
have adopted the doctrine of comparative rectitude, under which the
chancellor weighs the comparative fault of the parties and grants a
divorce to the one least blameworthy. 11 A third category of cases rec-
ognizes -that there are inequities in a rigorous application of the
doctrine of recrimination and has provided relief by limiting the ap-
plication of the doctrine to certain classes of cases.' 2 Finally, the fourth
category includes decisions which, while not mentioning comparative
rectitude, have allowed the trial courts to exercise discretion and in
some instances have granted a divorce even though the party bring-
ing the action is chargeable with misconduct.' 3 The decisions in this
IN.D. Cent. Code §§ 14-05-10, 14-05-15.
"Hoellinger v. Hoellinger, 38 N.D. 636, 166 N.W. 519 (1918).
'Supra note 4, at 814.
DIbid.
'0Supra note 1.
'Eals v. Swan, 221 La. 329, 59 So. 2d 409 (1952); see, Gabler v. Gabler, 72
Nev. 325, 304 P.2d 404 (1956); see, Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125.120 (1961).
'2Guillot v. Guillot, 42 R.I. 23o, io6 At. 8oi (1919).
1 Vanderhuff v. Vanderhuff, 144 F.2d 5o9 (D.C. Cir. 1944); Stewart v. Stewart,
158 Fla. 326, 29 So. 2d 247 (1946).
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category recoguize that rarely will a divorce action come before the
courts where either party is entirely blameless.
The decisions from Massachusetts are typical of the first category.
For example in Reddington v. Reddington,14 the Supreme Judicial
Court thought that to allow judicial discretion in granting or deny-
ing a divorce would result in derogation from the expressed objective
of uniformity of justice.15 Massachusetts expresses the view that the
whole public policy of the state is to be found in the divorce statute;
therefore, no judicial discretion can be allowed. The inequities in-
herent in this holding are apparent in the result of an early Rhode
Island case, Mathewson v. Mathewson,0 in which the husband de-
serted the wife, enlisted in the service, and remained absent for
twenty-seven years. The wife, presuming his death, remarried, after
which the husband returned accompanied by a second wife and chil-
dren. Even though the action was not contested, the court refused the
wife a divorce because she lived with the second husband for a short
time after she had knowledge of the return of the first husband. The
result was reached due to the existence of the recriminatory defense.'1
A further shortcoming in the absolute recrimination rule is that it
may result in the working of fraud upon the court. Often such suits
are not contested, but this may result only after one of the parties has
been required to give up substantial financial benefits to insure that
the existing recriminatory defense will not be used against him.' 8
An increasing number of states have begun to liberalize their views
with regard to the doctrine of recrimination. In several states this
liberalization has taken form in the acceptance of the doctrine of
comparative recitude, the second category of decisions outlined above.
By this principle where both spouses are at fault the one least guilty
may be given a divorce. This doctrine has found great favor with
modern sociological writers in that it tends to de-emphasize the ele-
ment of fault in the divorce proceeding. The cornerstone of the doc-
trine is to allow divorce regardless of fault on the theory that society
will be better served by terminating marriages in law which are, and
have been, non-existent in fact. It has been suggested that in compara-
"317 Mass. 76o, 59 N.E.2d 775 (1945).
159 N.E.2d at 778.
iS8 R.I. 455, 28 At. 8oi (1894); accord, Whippen v. Whippen, 147 Mass. 294,
17 N.E. 644 (1888).
17"It appearing, then, that the petitioner, whether equally guilty with the
respondent or not, has been guilty of conduct which would be a sufficient ground
for divorce, she is not entitled to this relief prayed for in her petition." 28 Atl.
at 8o0.
lSDeBrugh v. DeBrugh, 59 Cal. 2d 858, 250 P.2d 598, 604 (1952).
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tive rectitude, where the parties are found to be at equal fault neither
will be given relief,19 but the statutes generally provide that when the
parties are found in equal wrong, the court "may" in its discretion
refuse to grant a divorce.20
The third group of cases offers some relief to the parties by except-
ing certain inequitable cases from the principle of recrimination, or
by applying it only in limited situations. One example of this is in
the area of cases based on adultery, traditionally the strongest re-
criminatory defense. Pennsylvania has allowed a divorce regardless
of the plaintiff's adultery where the plaintiff's ground is the defen-
dant's desertion, and the adulterous act occurs after the desertion
has continued for the necessary statutory period so as to become a
valid ground for divorce.2 ' If the adulterous act occurs within this
period, the plaintiff is denied a divorce.
Among other exceptions, Illinois has allowed an adulterous wife
a divorce based on the husband's cruelty where the defendant had con-
doned the adultery by cohabitation after the commission of adultery.
22
The Texas court held that in order to employ a recriminatory defense
with success, the conduct relied on by the plaintiff as grounds for di-
vorce must have been induced by or in retaliation of plaintiff's own
misconduct.23 The relief provided by these exceptions and limita-
tions to recrimination is desirable, but retains an element of inflex-
ibility in the court's approach; therefore, the preferable course is to
retain 'the principle of recrimination in the statutes, vesting the
trial courts with discretion to decree divorce regardless of recrimina-
tion where public policy would be thereby served.
This is the view taken by cases representing the final category of
decisions. In a 1952 decision, DeBurgh v. DeBurgh,24 the Supreme
Court of California, upon facts similar to those in Kucera, ruled that
the trial court must exercise discretion when confronted with a re-
crimination case. The California Civil Code provides: "Divorces must
19Eals v. Swan, 221 La. 329, 59 So. 2d 409 (1952). White v. White, 281 P.2d 745
(Okla. 1955).
"'E.g., Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 6o-i5o6 (1949).
"Ristine v. Ristine, 4 Rawle 460 (Pa. 1834), Mendenhall v. Mendenhall, 12
Pa. Super. 29o (19oo). Contra, Kim v. Kim, 138 Va. 132, 12o S.E. 850 (1924). See,
Clapp v. Clapp, 97 Mass. 531 (1867).
2Klekamp v. Klekamp, 275 Ill. 98, 113 N.E. 852 (1916).
2Trigg v. Trigg, 18 S.W. 313 (Tex. 1891). Texas has further limited its
doctrine by requiring that the plaintiff's misconduct must be of the same general
character as that of the defendant. Warfield v. Warfield, 161 S.W.2d 533 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1942).
0139 Cal. 3d 858, 250 P.2d 598 (1952).
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be denied upon showing:... 4. Recrimination; ... "25 and further
provides: "Recrimination is a showing by the defendant of any cause
of divorce against the plaintiff, in bar of the plaintiff's cause of di-
vorce." 26 Judge Traynor, speaking for the majority said:
"It has sometimes been assumed that any cause of divorce
constitutes a recriminatory defense. The legislative language
however, is ill-adapted to such a broad purpose .... Had the
Legislature meant to make every cause of divorce an absolute
defense, it could easily have provided that: 'divorces must be
denied upon ... a showing by the defendant of any cause of
divorce against the plaintiff.' We are bound to consider the ad-
ditional requirement that such a cause of divorce must be 'in
bar' of the plaintiff's cause of divorce." 27
The court did not enumerate the conditions necessary to establish
recrimination "in bar" to plaintiff's relief,2 8 but stated that the qual-
ification worked as a mandate upon the courts to recognize and apply
the public policy of the state through judicial discretion in weighing
the extenuating circumstances of the case, which may require that a
divorce be granted irrespective of the showing of a valid recriminatory
defense. The rule announced, as opposed to a mechanical application
of the concepts of fault as manifested by the statute enumerating
specific grounds for divorce, resulted in the ultimate decision that
a recriminatory defense "in bar" to the wife's cause for divorce had
not been made out. Thus, it would appear that the court in Kucera
could have found authority to affirm the trial court's exercise of judi-
2 Cal. Civ. Code § 111.
: Cal. Civ Code § 122.
"25o P.2d at 6oo.
2 The court at page 6o6 did indicate, however, that four major considerations
should govern this decision:
i. The prospect of reconciliation-Based on the ages and temperaments of the
parties, the seriousness and frequency of their misconduct, the length of their
marriage, and any other relevant considerations, the court should determine the
likelihood that the marriage can be saved.
2. The effect of the marital conflict upon the parties-If continued, where the
marriage is likely to result in physical brutality, then in the interest of the wel-
fare of the parties the relation should be terminated.
3. The effect of the marital conflict upon third parties-The court should be
reluctant to terminate a marriage where children are involved; however, extreme
hatred and violence may dictate otherwise.
4. Comparative guilt-The parties will seldom be "in pari delicto" before the
court. Also, one spouse may indicate substantial repentance and reform. A consider-
ation of these factors should bring the court to decide whether public policy
demands the continuance of the marriage.
1963]
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cial discretion without requiring a statutory amendment.29 By so doing,
the court could have reached the result which it thought to be more
prudent.
This result has been reached in the District of Columbia where
the court recognizes the doctrine of recrimination but refuses to hold
that it is an absolute bar to the granting of a divorce. The decision
was reached in the case of Vanderhuff v. Vanderhuff,30 on a liberal
reading of a 1935 amendment to the divorce statutes;31 however, the
construction has been criticized as not supported by the statute.32
Parliament acknowledged the propriety of allowing the trial court
discretion in recrimination cases from the earliest time that it allowed
the courts to grant absolute divorce.
33
It is important to note that in many instances the results obtained
in states following the doctrine of recrimination applied with judicial
discretion and those reached in jurisdictions following comparative
rectitude will not vary. For this reason, many states appear beset
with uncertainty in their decisions. Michigan experimented with the
doctrine of comparative rectitude and then rejected it, re-embracing
the principle of recrimination. 34 Pennsylvania has remained un-
committed.35 Florida, in Stewart v. Stewart,36 leaned toward compara-
tive rectitude but did not openly adhere to the doctrine.
'IThree members of the court in DeBurgh, concurred in the result but dis-
sented as to the reasoning of the majority opinion, stating that it was a judicial
repeal of the recrimination provision of the Code. 250 P.2d at 6o8. Also, in Mueller
v. Mueller, 44 Cal. 2d 527, 282 P.2d 869 (1955), on the strength of the comparative
guilt language in DeBurgh, (supra note 28) a divorce was granted to both parties
a course normally associated with the doctrine of comparative rectitude. However,
at least two other states with statutes similar or identical to those of California
and North Dakota have relied on the DeBurgh case to read discretion into their
recrimination statutes. Howay v. Howay, 74 Idaho 492, 264 P.2d 691 (1953); Bissell v.
Bissell, 129 Mont. 187, 284 P.2d 264, 271 (955). In Howay the court expressly said
that it was not extending the discretionary power of the court as far as California
had in DeBurgh. 264 P.2d at 697.
so 44 F.2d 509 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
31D.C. Code § 16-4o3 (1940); 144 F.2d at 5o9-1o.
12Note, 23 Texas L. Rev. 194 (1945).
3Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857, 20 & 21 Vict., c. 85 § 31.
'Weiss v. Weiss, 174 Mich. 431, 14o N.W. 587 (1913), allowed a divorce where
both parties were at fault based on "the peculiar exigencies of the case" but later
in Hatfield v. Hatfield, 213 Mich. 368, 181 N.W. 968 (1921), reaffirmed the doctrine
of recrimination and criticized the position taken in the earlier case. The latter
position was affirmed in Radzinski v. Radzinski, 234 Mich. 144, 207 N.W. 821 (1926).
-Dearth v. Dearth, 141 Pa. Super. 344, 15 A.2d 37 (1940).
'6,58 Fla. 326, 29 So. 2d 247 (1946). The majority in Stewart used language to
the effect that they were merely allowing discretion to be exercised in connection
with recrimination, but Justice Fabisinski, dissenting, took the position that the
majority was adopting comparative rectitude.
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The distinction between recrimination with discretion and com-
parative rectitude is one of emphasis and approach. The latter ap-
proach embraces the theory that to deny divorce results only in frus-
tration of the parties, tending to promote adulterous relationships and
increasing the danger of illegitimate births. Thus, for the immediate
benefits of the parties, divorces are decreed more freely. With this
approach, there comes a decline in the importance of the family unit
in our society. The court accepting comparative rectitude, in essence,
holds that this is preferable to imposing the hardships of denying a
divorce to a delinquent plantiff.
On the other hand, the doctrine of recrimination places em-
phasis on the stability of the martial status. When the parties come
before the court to resolve their differences, individual re-evaluation
and improvement in conduct are sought as objectives, 37 as opposed to
freely allowing the parties to go their separate ways. Since Williams v.
North Carolina,3s no state may absolutely impose its public policy,
with regard to the institution of marriage, upon its citizens. By that
decision North Carolina was required to give "full faith and credit"
to a Nevada divorce decree granted after six weeks domicile in that
state and resting on constructive service upon the defendant. The fact
that one state may have its public policy thwarted by the decree of
a laxer state should not play a role in the determination of what the
policy shall be. It is contended that recrimination as a defense to a
divorce action should be retained in our law. But its application should
be tempered by the allowance of judicial discretion. Further, the ex-
ercise of this discretion in turn should be tempered by the realiza-
tion that the family is the basic unit of our society which nurtures
and develops the individual initiative characterizing a free nation. It
is in the best public interest that this status be continuing from one
generation to the next. But where a marriage has been destroyed to
the point where no value to society can be expected and the welfare
of the parties may be endangered by violence, hatred, and immorality,
then little utility can be obtained from its continuance. Only when
recrimination is viewed in this light can it result in a nearer approach
to equality and uniformity of justice.
JOHN RICHARD CANTERBURY
"In Andrews v. Andrews, 162 Ore. 614, 94 P.2d 3oo (1939), the court, after
denying a divorce where both parties were convinced that they could no longer
live together, said: "It is hoped that common sense and righteousness may yet pre-
vail in this disturbed household."
'-.317 U.S.287 (1942). See also Sherrer v. Sherrer, 343 U.S. 343 (1948).
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